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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EMPLOYERS ~IUTUAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF WIS-
CONSIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ALLEN OIL COMPANY and KEN-
NETH THORESEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
LA FORGE DAS-TRUP and FLORA 
DAS-TRUP, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
Civil No. 7733 
Civil No. 7734 
ALLEN OIL C·OMPANY and KEN-
NETH THORE·SEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
S.TATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above entitled cases were filed as separate ac-
tions in the District Court of Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, but inasmuch as the injuries complained of in both 
cases grew out of the same set of circumstances the cases 
were combined for trial (TR 4-5). 
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Separate Notices of Appeal and separate Appeal 
Bonds were filed, but an order has heretofore been enter-
~d consolidating the two cases before the Supreme Court 
for hearing on appeal. 
Of course, but one transcript has been prepared and 
filed on appeal. However, the pleadings and proceedings 
in the separate cases, up to the time of the trial in the 
District Court, have been trans1nitted to the Supren1e 
Court. 
Wherever there are any differences in the positions 
and rights of the plaintiffs Dastrup and the plaintiff Em-
ployers Mutual Liability Insurance Company on this ap-
peal, such differences will be pointed out, so that the 
rights of the separate parties may be considered on their 
merits by the appeal court where necessary or advisable. 
Throughout this brief the parties will be referred to 
as plaintiffs and defendants as they were in the trial 
court. 
In the action filed by the plaintiffs Dastrup, they 
sought to recover damages against the defendant Allen 
Oil Company and one of its truck drivers, Kenneth 
T-=horesen, for the destruction of the plaintiffs' gasoline 
station and store at Altamont in Duchesne County, Utah, 
admittedly resulting from a gasoline fire and explosion 
which occurred on August 2·3rd, 1946, while the defend-
ant Allen Oil Company through its agent, the defendant 
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.A.t the tilne of the fire and explosion, one Dean Cox 
had just driYen into the Dastrup service station with a 
pick-up truck belonging to the l\Ioon Lake Electric Com-
pany. ..A.s a result of the fire and explosion, the Moon 
Lake truck "~as practically den1olished, and Mr. Cox re-
ceived certain physical injuries. The plaintiff Employers 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company carried the insur-
ance on the truck and also industrial compensation in-
surance covering 1\lr. Cox's employer and Mr. Cox as an 
employee. ....\..dmittedly, the plaintiff Insurance Company 
paid for the damages to the truck and also paid indus-
trial compensation to 1\Ir. Cox for his injuries, as well as 
for medical care and hospitalization. The Insurance 
Company's action is for reimbursement for the amounts 
paid on the claims presented against that company based 
on the insurance coverage hereinbefore mentioned. 
The evidence is uncontroverted to the effect that 
on the 23rd day of August, 1946, the plaintiffs Dastrup 
owned and operated a general store, together with a gas-
oline sevice station, at Altamont, a rather remote sn1all 
settlement about 30 miles to the north of the to,vn of 
Duchesne, in Duchesne County, Utah. For some time 
prior to August 23rd, 1946, the Dastrups had purchased 
petroleum products, including gasoline, from the defend-
ant Allen Oil Company (TR 119). On August 23rd, 1946, 
which was a clear, hot day, the defendant Kenneth Thore-
sen drove a large gasoline tanker loaded with gasoline 
from Salt Lake City to Altamont to be delivered to the 
Dastrup gasoline tanks at their service station, immedi-
ately in front of their store, pursuant to an order re-
ceived by the Allen Oil Company from Mr. Dastrup. 
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The defendant Thoresen arrived at the Dastrup 
premises some time about mid-afternoon on the day in 
question. He was warned upon his arrival by Mrs. Das-
trup that the center of the three gasoline tanks owned by 
the Dastrups was slightly tilted, and that he was to be 
sure not to fill it completely (TR 169; 408). The plain-
tiffs' evidence clearly shows that the defendant Thore-
sen, the agent of the Allen Oil Company, put a metal 
nozzle into a metal intake running into the center tank on 
the Dastrup premises in a negligent manner; that he 
thereupon turned a large flow of gasoline from the tank-
er through a hose to which the nozzle was attached, and 
then went into the store and left the gasoline· flowing un~ 
attended ( TR 153-52; 409) ; that while he was gone a 
large quantity of gasoline overflowed from the fill-pipe 
and nozzle onto the surrounding pavement as well as on-
to the island where the pumps were located, and that 
Neal Dastrup, a S'On of the· plaintiffs Dastrup, called to 
Thoresen, who was. in the store, and told hin1 that the 
gasoline was overflowing (TR 154). Thoresen then ran 
out of the store and started to turn off the gasoline flow-
ing through the hose. About the time he· got the gasoline 
·shut off and the hose uncoupled from the truck, and while 
the truck was still standing by the pumps a fire and ex-
plosion occurred ( TR 400; 155-56) which destroyed the 
Dastrup gasoline station, their store with all of their 
stock of goods and equipment, and p·ut them out of busi~ 
ness for a considerable period of time. The Moon Lake 
truck driven by Cox was damaged and Cox was injured. 
4 
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The plaintiffs contend that the fire and explosion 
resulted fro1u the cre~tion of an explosive medium of air 
and gasoline vapor resulting from the negligent spilling 
of gasoline on the hot pavement and around the pumps, 
,vhich explosive medium was ignited by a spark caused 
through so1ne of the manipulations of Thoresen in han-
dling the hose in the fill-pipe, by dropping a wrench or 
coupling upon the gravel, through static electricity dis-
charged from the truck, by walking upon the surrounding 
pavement or gravel, or by some other act for which the 
plaintiffs were not responsible. The defendants contend-
ed that the plaintiffs were negligent in the construction 
and maintenance of their gasoline storage facilities. 
The jury brought in a verdict in each case for the 
defendants, and each of them, and against the plaintiffs, 
and each of them, "No cause for action." Separate mo-
tions were made in the two cases for new trials. The 
motions were denied. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the court 
erred in his rulings on the admission and exclusion of 
evidence, as well as in his refusal to give certain request-
ed instructions, and in the giving of certain erroneous 
instructions, and in denying plaintiffs' motions for a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON F'OR 
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT 
The points relied upon by the appellants for reversal 
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POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE DEFEND-
ANTS' WITNESS LANGFORD TO TESTIFY THAT THE 
INSTALLATION OF THE FACILITIES ON THE DASTRUP 
PREMISES FOR THE STORAGE OF GASOLINE DID NOT 
CONFORM TO SAFE PRACTICES. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE C·O,URT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF 0. C. AL.L.EN, PRESIDENT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT ALLEN OIL· c·oMP ANY (TR. 582, 583, 585, 586). 
POINT NO. III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN IT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
THE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
AND 7. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTR.UCT-
IONS NUMBER 13 AND 14 BECAUSE THE SAID IN-
STRUC·TIONS 'VERE MIS.LEADING, CONFUSING, IN-
COMPLETE AND AN ERRO·NEOUS STATEMENT OF 
THE L.AW. 
POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY IN-
STRUCTION NUMBER 16 BECAUSE UNDER THE UN-
DISPUTED EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS WERE 
GUIL.TY OF NEG-LIGENCE. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMB~ER 18. 
POINT NO. VII. 
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POINT NO. VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INS.TR.UCTION 
NO. 22. 
POINT NO. IX. 
AS TO THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS MUTUAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMP'ANY IN CASE NO·. 7734, 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 23 DIREC'I:'ING THE JURY TO FTND THE ISSUES 
AGAINST THE SAID P'LAINTIFF IF IT FOUND THAT 
DEAN COX, DRIVER OF THE MO·ON LAKE TRUCK, 
WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT NO. X. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PL,AIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THE CASE OF 
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY COMPANY. 
POINT NO. XI. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S DASTRUP FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE DEFEND-
ANTS' WITNESS LANGFORD TO TESTIFY THAT THE 
INSTALLATION OF THE FACILITIES ON THE DASTRUP 
PREMISES FOR THE STORAGE OF GASOLINE DID NOT 
CONFORM TO SAFE PRACTICES. 
One y··. C. Langford was called as a witness for the 
defendants. This witness \vas asked by counsel for Allen 
Oil Company, after counsel had p-ropounded a long 
hypothetical question, to state his conclusion concerning 
the situation on D~astrups' property. Defendants' coun-
sel asked this question: 
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"Now I ask you, in your experience, if that 
set-up that I have described to you was a place 
for the storage of gasoline which did comply with 
safe practices in the oil industry~" 
Objection was made to the question. The court 
pointed out that perhaps there were some items included 
in the question upon which there wasn't sufficient evi-
dence, but that such evidence could be offered later. 
Counsel for plaintiffs, however, insisted upon the objec-
tion that Mr. Langford was not qualified to answer the 
question, and "also that he (counsel) is asking for an 
ultimate statement of fact which is invading the province 
of the jury." The court overruled both objections. 
Counsel ror plaintiffs then insisted upon the answer 
in these words: 
"Just state whether it does or does not con-
form to safe practices. 
A. It does not." 
Very clearly the witness was testifying as to an 
ultimate fact. Furthermore, he was not qualified to 
answer. 
Under no circumstances can a witness state as an 
ultimate fact that which a jury is selected to deter1nine. 
The witness Langford stated clearly that the situation 
presented to him, which was not an accurate presentation 
of the facts, was not safe. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF 0. C. ALLEN, PRESIDENT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT ALLEN OIL COMPANY (TR. 582, 583, 585, 586). 
8 
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The plaintiff8 called as a rebuttal vvitness 0. C. 
Allen, \vho \Vas president of the defenda:r:tt Allen Oil 
Company on August :23, 1946, when the fire and Hxplosion 
complained of occurred (Tr. 582). 
After ~Ir. Allen had testified that he was subpoenaed 
by the defendants, and that he was the president of the 
Allen Oil Company on August 23, 1946, he was asked 
the following question: 
Q. nlr. Allen, directing your attention to the fact 
that on the LaForge Dastrup· premises in 
Altamont there were certain tanks, gasoline 
storage tanks, installed in an underground, 
unfilled chamber. Did you know of that con-
dition on and prior to August 23, 1946 f' 
(Tr. 582). 
Thereupon the following pToceedings occurred: 
"MR. RICE: Just a minute. 
"MR. YOUNG: On behalf of the defendant 
Thoresen we object to that. 
"THE COURT: On what ground? 
"1fR. YOUNG: On the ground it is irnmate-
rial and incompetent-any knowledge upon him 
can't be binding upon this defendant as an indi-
vidual. They're suing this man as an individual, 
your Honor. 
"THE COURT : I wonder if this question 
of knowledge has anything to do with what we 
have before us. 
"MR. RICE: I object to it on the ground 
that it is immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: The objection will be sus-
tained." ( Tr. 582-583). 
9 
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The plaintiffs then made the following offer out 
of the presence of the jury: 
"MR. WILSON: If your Honor please, 
come now the plaintiffs and hereby offer to pro-
duce to the court and jury, through the witness 
0. C. Allen, who was just sworn, testimony to 
this effect: that while he was president of the 
Allen Oil Company, as he testified, and prior 
to August 23, 1946, he learned of the installation 
of the tanks in the underground chamber as 
testified to in this case, and of the general instal-
lations connected therevvi th, and that he was 
aware of such conditions through information 
he had, on the 23rd day of August, 1946, when 
the delivery of gasoline vvas made to the plain-
tiffs Dastrup, as has been testified to in this 
record; and that particularly the president of 
the Allen Oil Company knew that the tanks on 
the Dastrup premises to which gasoline was de-
livered by the Allen Oil Company were installed 
in an underground, open chamber on August 
23, 1946, at the time of the delivery of the gasoline 
in question. 
"MR. RIC·E: I suppose our objection would 
go to the offer. 
"THE COURT: This is just making the 
offer. You objected to it and the court sustained 
the objection. 
"MR. WILSON: That is the offer. 
"THE COURT: That is all of that." (Tr. 
585-586). 
The only point urged by the court in his menloran-
dum denying the motion for new trials (Tr. 798, et seq.) 
in support of sustaining the objection to the offer of 
10 
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the ..t\.llen testimony '"·as that it \vas part of the plaintiffs' 
case in chief, and should have been offered a.s part of 
the plaintiffs' main case. It is very evident, however, 
fron1 the court's 1nemorandum that his reasons are an 
afterthought, because the record of the trial shows very 
clearly that counsel for the; defendant as well as the 
court did not have in 1nind that the evidence wa.s out of 
order, but that it 'vas immaterial and irrelevant. Now, 
obviously testimony if offered out of order isn't neces-
sarily irrelevant and immaterial. Furthermore, the pur-
pose of the trial is to get all the facts. Rule 1 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the said 
rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
Rule 43 lT.C.P. provides that "all evidence shall be 
admitted which is admissible under the statutes of this 
state or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied 
to the courts in this state. In any case, the statute or 
rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs, 
and the evidence shall be p,resented according to the 
most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes 
or rules to which reference is herein made. The com-
petency of a witness to testify shall be determined in 
like manner." 
The court 1n his memorandum also states, "The 
argument made in plaintiffs' brief that the offered testi-
mony was rebuttal of the defense of contributory negli-
gence would have great merit if it weren't for the fact 
that plaintiffs relied upon the faulty construction of 
11 
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the tanks, and defendants' knowledge thereof, as estab-
lishing the high degree of care required of the defend~ 
ants, in their delivery of gasoline, (Tr. 800). 
Again the court had forgotten the situation, because 
the plaintiffs relied only upon the fact that one tank 
was tilted, and placed no reliance whatever on the ques-
tion of the installation of the tanks in an open chamber 
or the installation of the electric compressor motor in 
an adjoining room. The evidence shovvs that plaintiffs 
Dastrup thought their installations were properly made 
and maintained. 
Leland Stephensen, a licensed plumber and building 
contractor, testified that the tanks, the vents and the 
connections for putting the gas into the tanks and remov-
ing it therefrom were properly made (Tr. 143-144). 
Drew Allred, a witness called on behalf of the de-
fendants, testified that he installed the electric colnpres-
sor and that the: installation was properly made (Tr. 
83). 
La Forge Dastrup, one of the plaintiffs, testified 
as follows: 
"Q. Had you on various occasions gone from the 
small basement room into the place where 
the storage tanks were kept~ 
"A. Yes, sir. I check that on every load. 
"Q. Had you been into that room to make an 
inspection prior to the 23rd of August, 19461 
"A. y es. 
"Q. How long before the 23rd of August, 1946, 
was it that you made your last inspection 
in that room~ 
12 
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".A.. I'd say t\\·o \Yeeks, possibly threP. 
'' Q. From the time you made your inspecti<!>n in 
that room had there been any delivery of 
gasoline to your premises prior to the gas-
oline delivery on August 23, 1946~ 
HA. Yes, sir. 
•'Q. Had there been any prior to that time, prior 
to the tin1e-after the time of your inspection 
and prior to this other inspection~ 
··A. No, sir. 
~·Q. N O\V when you went in and made your inspec-
tion prior to August 23, 1946, will you statEt 
if anything what you found. 
~-A. Well, I had these tanks all painted up nice 
and I observed that they were in good con-
dition. 
"'Q. \\Tere any of them leaking~ 
"A. N . o, s1r. 
~'Q. Did you find any indication of gas leaking 
into that basement room~ 
·•A. No, sir." (Tr. 2'1-22). 
The defendants really based their whole defense 
on the ground that the plaintiffs, and each of them, 
were guilty of contributory negligence. The contributory 
negligence complained of, or at least which the defend-
ants sought to prove, was entirely on the part of the 
plaintiffs Dastrup. The alleged contributory negligence 
consisted of the claim that the installation of the under-
ground tanks in an open room or ·chamber and the main-
tenance of the electric compressor engine were negligent. 
Defendants' first witness was Drew Allred who testified 
13 
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that he installed the electric engine in question. Mr. 
Allred. state·d that all the installations he made were 
properly made (Tr. 83), according to prescribed regula-
tions; that no electricity at all could pass through the 
motor unless it was in operation, and that it didn't oper-
ate unless the air pressure went down, and then the 
motor started automatically (Tr. 83 and 84). 
The next witness was one V. C. Langford. He testi-
fied that the installations around the Da.strup premises 
were unsafe. He was asked, "Now I ask you, in your 
experience, if that set-up that I have described to you 
as a place for the storage of gasoline, would it comply 
with safe practice in the oil industry~" 
To which Mr. Langford replied, "No, it doesn't." 
(Tr. 352-357). 
The other witnesses testified to substantially the 
S'ame effect. In other words, the defense was that plain-
tiffs Dastrup were negligent in maintaining tanks in an 
unfilled, underground chambeT. 
It was, therefore, very proper rebuttal to show that 
the defendants who were making the gasoline delivery 
at fue time the fire and explosion occurred, had, for 
some time prior to the date of the injuries complained 
of, known of the manner in which the Dastrup tanks 
were installed and maintained, and notwithstanding said 
fact made their deliveries. Furthermore, the undisputed 
testimony showed that two of the pumps and two of the 
three storage tanks installed and in use on the Dastrup 
property on August 23, 1946, were owned by the defend-
ant Allen Oil Company (Tr. 42, line 27). 
14 
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In his 1nen1orandun1 in ~upport of his ruling ag·ainst 
the motion for ne"· trial the Judge stated, "The testi-
rnony of defendant Thoresen established that he was 
n1aking his first delivery to plaintiffs' tanks when the 
explosion occurred." The court is in error in n1aking 
such an inadvertent staten1ent. Thoresen didn't testify 
as to 'vhether he had n1ade any previous deliveries or 
not. He stated that he did make one later delivery 
(Tr. 407-408). However, there was testimony by plain-
tiffs~ 'vitnesses that Thoresen had made at least one 
previous delivery ( Tr. 96). Furthermore, the testimony 
shows numerous deliveries of great quantities of gasoline 
to Dastrups by Allen Oil Company before August 23, 
1946 ( Tr. 19, lines 22-27). 
The position taken by the trial Judge in his memor-
andum is untenable when viewed in light of the record 
made at the trial. 
\Ve contend, of course, that the testin1ony was 
proper rebuttal, since both defendants relied aln1ost 
entirely for their defense upon the alleged negligence 
of Mr. and nfrs. Dastrup in constructing and maintain-
ing an underground chamber with an electric engine 
in an adjoining room. Practically all their witnesses 
testified concerning the fact that failure to fill in with 
earth or other material the space in the underground 
chamber around the gasoline storage tanks was bad 
practice, and the principal witnesses for the defendants 
testified that the maintenance of the electric engine near 
the unfilled underground chamber was the essential 
element that brought about the explosion and fire. ~fr. 
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Allen's testimony \vas offered for the purpose of showing 
that, as President of the Allen Oil Company, he knew 
the way in which the tanks for the storage of gasoline 
were constructed and maintained. Surely, the jury was 
entitled to know, through Mr. Allen's testimony, that 
the defendant corporation knew of the existing condi-
tions. The jury was entitled to deter1nine whether that 
fact had any bearing on the alleged contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiffs. 
The two expert witnesses (Dr. ~Ielvin A. Cook and 
Dr. Loren Bryner) called by the defendants to explain 
the fire and explosion testified that the maintenance of 
the electric engine near the unfilled underground storage 
chamber was in their opinion the essential elen1ent that 
brought about the explosion and fire (Tr. 510, line 18). 
Mr. Allen's testimony was offered for the purpose 
of showing that as president of the Allen Oil Company 
he knew, and therefore the defendant Allen Oil Com-
pany knew, the manner in which the gasoline storage 
tanks and compressor on the Dastrup premises 'vere 
installed and maintained; that he knew and, therefore, 
the defendant company kne\v of all the conditions on the 
Dastrup premises testified to by defendants' wi h1esses 
a.s constituting contributory negligence; and notwith-
standing that knowledge this oil company, whose busi-
ness it was to deal in the distribution of gasoline, made 
the delivery. Surely the jury was entitled to determine 
whether those facts had any bearing on the alleged 
negligence of the defendants, and on the alleged con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiffs. By excluding 
tllat evidence the court deprived the plaintiffs of pre-
16 
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senting a very in1portant aspect of their case and de-
prived the jury of learning the full facts and circunl-
stances covering the rights of the parties. 
Peterson vs. Betts (\Vashington), 165 Pac. 2nd 95, 
was a case in 'vhich the evidence showed that the defend-
ants making the gasoline delivery to premises which 
were allegedly maintained in an unsafe condition had 
no knowledge concerning the manner in which the gaso-
line tanks and connections were maintained on the 
premises to which the delivery was made. 
The court held th·at although there is no duty resting 
upon one who delivers gasoline in bulk to a purchaser 
on the latter's premises to inspect the purchaser's stor-
age facilities to determine whether such facilities are 
safe, yet the court quoted with approval the following 
rule laid down in Allegretti vs. Murphy-Miles Oil Com-
pany (Illinois), N.E. 2nd 389 at 391: 
~'The rule is, that where one furnishing bulk 
products does not install the receptacle for those 
products or the piping connecting such receptacle 
with the source of sup·ply necessary to fill them, 
and does not own or have control over them, he 
is not responsible for the condition of their main-
tenance, and cannot be held liable for injuries 
caused by an accident arising out of a defective 
condition in such receptacle or its equipment, 
in the absence of knowledge of such defect." 
It would seem to follow, therefore, th·at liability 
would attach if a company making such deliveries had 
knowledge of the defects. 
17 
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We are not, of course, conceding that there was any 
negligence on the part of the Dastrups in the manner 
in which they installed and maintained their facilities 
for the recepton and distribution of gasoline delivered 
by the Allen Oil Company, but we do contend that if 
it was proper to admit evidence of the installation and 
maintenance of the Dastrup storage tanks in an unfilled 
underground chamber, and of the electric compressor 
engine in an adjoining room, and that if the jury as in-
structed by the court could find that the Dastrup instal-
lations were defective and unsafe, then surely no testi-
mony that was offered in the entire case was Inore per-
tinent and entitled to greater weight than the testimony 
which the plaintiffs offered to produce through the presi-
dent of the Allen Oil Company that the defendant knew 
of all those conditions and yet made delivery of gasoline 
as though the Dastrup installations had met e-very pos-
sible prescribed standard. 
The evidence is unusually important in view of the 
fact that with the knowledge of the existence of the 
unfilled, underground chamber, the Allen Oil Company 
permitted gasoline to overflow in such a manner that 
it could evaporate and form an explosive medium with 
air in the said chamber, ·and an inflammable medium 
around the pumps, and so manipulated the delivery 
facilities under the full control of the said Allen Oil 
Company and its agent that a spark was created to ignite 
the explosive or inflammable medium created through 
the negligence of the Allen Oil Company. 
18 
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A reading of the Peter:)vn case (~upra) clearly 
reveals that the court considered the question of the 
knowledge of the defendant making the delivery con-
cerning the condition of the premises to which the de-
livery was being made, a deciding factor in determining 
the question of negligence. 
In the case of Loverde vs. Consumer's Petroleum 
Comparny (Illinois), 63 N.E. 2nd 673, the court held 
that an "oil company, through its agents, owed duty to 
use ordinary care in the delivery of oil and the com-
pany's agents were bound to use caution commensurate 
with known danger." 
That case again clearly indicates that the court 
placed great emphasis on the question of the. knowledge 
of the persons making. the delivery of explosive sub-
stances concerning the conditions existing where the 
deliveries 'vere made. 
It was highly important to the· plaintiffs that the 
knowledge of the defendants concerning the conditions 
on the Dastrup premises be made known to the jury. 
Such evidence might well have been the turning point 
in the case. 
Even though the evidence offered through the wit-
ness Allen, could in any manner be construed as having 
been offered out of order, no objections were made to 
it upon that ground. Had such an objection been made, 
it would have been an easy matter for plaintiffs to have 
asked leave of court to offer the evidence as part of 
their case in chief. 
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"The fact that the matter could have been offered 
1n chief, does not preclude its admission in rebuttal." 
French vs. Hall, 119 U.S. 152; St. Paul Plow Works vs. 
Starling, 140 U.S. 184; Throckmorton vs. Holt, 180 U.S. 
552; Lewis vs. Tappen, 45 Alt. 459, 47 L.R.A. 385. 
POINT NO. III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE THE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6 AND 7. 
In Instruction Number 6 (Tr. 'i-09) the plaintiffs 
requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: 
"If you find that the plaintiffs Dastrup con-
structed and maintained their premises in such 
a manner as to constitute a fire hazard, such 
fact or facts may or may not constitute contribu-
tory negligence. And if you find that a person 
knowing the condition of the premises and not-
withstanding said knowledge acted neglig~ntly, 
the proximate result of which caused injury to 
plaintiffs, then you may find in favor of plaintiffs 
and against the person having said knowledge." 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 7 (Tr. 709) 
reads as follows : 
"If you find that the plaintiffs Dastrup con-
structed and maintained their premises in such 
a manner as to constitute· a fire hazard such fact 
or facts may or may not constitute contributory 
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negligenee. There i8 no evidence that any act of 
the plaintiffs in this case was unlawful and the 
la'v allo"'"S a person to make any lawful use of 
his property he deems best. Furthermore the 
la'v does not require a person to anticipate the 
negligent acts of another." 
The eourt refused to give either of these instructions 
and the plaintiffs objected to the court's refusal in the 
following 'vords: 
"Objects to the court's failure to give plain-
tiffs' requested Instruction No. 6, particularly-
in general, a~d particularly for the reason that 
in failing to give said instruction the court has 
refused to instruet on plaintiffs' theory of the 
case'' (Tr. 591). Similar exception was taken to 
No.7. 
There was no state law, nor any other public regu-
lation o£ any kind whatsoever, prohibiting the plaintiffs 
Dastrup fro1n constructing and maintaining their gas-
oline tanks, electric engine and pumps as they were 
installed and maintained. The use which the Dastrups 
made of their premises was a perfectly legal use. It 
was not a situation such as existed in the large-r cities 
of Utah where there were certain fire restrictions and 
other restrictions embodied in city ordinances. It was, 
therefore, error not to instruct the jury that the use 
which the Dastrups were making of their property at 
the time of the :fire and explosion in question was a legal 
and proper use, violating no law or other public regula-
tions of any type. 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As pointed out in the case of J. J. Mayou llfanu-
facturilng Compawy vs. Consumers Oil and Refining Com-
pany (Wyoming), 146 P. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243, "The 
mere fact that one may have a fire hazard on his prem-
ises, which he uses lawfully, does not amount to con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, so as to bar 
recovery by reason of the negligence of another in caus-
ing the fire and destroying the premises." 
The same case further points out that, "One is 
not bound to anticipate the negligent acts of another, and 
to expose oneself or his property to danger is not neces-
sarily contributory negligence; such negligence does 
not automatically_ arise merely because an accident might 
have been avoided." 
We are not suggesting that the court instructed 
that the Da.strups were guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. However, we do have in mind that it was highly 
prejudicial to the plaintiffs when the court refused to 
instruct that the use which the Dastrups made of their 
premises, and the method of the installation and main-
tenance of their gas equipment, were perfectly lawful. 
Such an instruction was of great importance to the plain-
tiffs in view of the fact that practically all of the defend-
ants' witnesses operated in areas covered by city ordi-
nances and fire regulations making restrictions against 
the use of premises in the city in the manner in which 
the Dastrups used their equipment in Duchesne County. 
The requested Instructions 6 and 7 are fully sup-
ported by the law as set forth in the Wyoming case, 146 
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Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243. That case reviews numer-
ous other cases and is followed by an exhaustive note 
beginning on page 1261 A.L.R. 
In the instant case the trial court seemed to feel 
that he had to keep a'vay from the jury any affirmative 
suggestion that what the plaintiffs Dastrup did on their 
premises didn't necessarily deprive them of their right 
to recover. But he went all out in instructing that what 
the plaintiffs did might well deprive them of their right 
to recover. For exan1ple, see Instructions 13 ( Tr. 759), 
14 (Tr. 759-60), 16 (Tr. 761), 17 (Tr. 726), 18 (Tr. 762), 
19 (Tr. 763), 20 (Tr. 763), 21 (Tr. 764), 22 (Tr. 764), 
and 23 (Tr. 764). See Johnson vs. Lewis Stages (Ut.) 240 
p 2 498. 
We are not in the least suggesting any bad faith 
on the part of the court. The Judge presided over the 
trial with great dignity and fairness. However, certain 
things occurred during the trial which made him ex-
tremely technical in his rulings against the plaintiffs. 
Upon complaint of counsel for the defendants (Tr. 288), 
the court called in one of the jurors, l\fr. Defa, and 
advised him that there had been complaints made of the 
misconduct of the jurors and the Judge proceeded to 
examine Mr. Defa concerning his conduct (Tr. 360-363). 
From the statement made by 1\fr. Rice (Tr. 366) 
concerning the misconduct of the jury, it will be observed 
that a doctor residing in the community, who was not 
on the jury, was called in and examined by the court 
upon the representation of counsel for the defendants 
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From the whole situation it will be seen that a feel-
ing of extreme caution unconsciously developed on the 
court's part in instructing concerning the liability of the 
defendants, while all instructions requested for the 
plaintiff which stated the plaintiffs' theory of the case 
were refused. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
NUMBER 13 AND 14 BECAUSE THE SAID INSTRUCTIONS 
WERE MISLEADING, CONFUSING, INCOMPLETE AND 
AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
In Instruction Number 13 (Tr. 75'9) the court 
charged the jury : 
"That a person injured by the negligence of 
another person cannot recover damages against 
such other person if the one seeking judgment 
against the other was himself negligent, and his 
negligence contributed in any degree, however 
slight, to produce his own injury and damage. 
This is what has been referred to in these instruc-
tions as contributory negligence. Thus is in this 
case, if you find that at the time and place alleged 
in plaintiffs' complaint the defendants were negli-
gent in one or more particulars therein set forth, 
but if you also find that the plaintiffs were them-
selves negligent in the manner of construction 
and maintenance of their underground tanks, 
or in the installation or upkeep of their compres-
sor upon their premises, or in their manner of 
storing gasoline, or their maintenance of their 
pumps, or their electric wiring, or the piping 
in connection -with their tanks or pumps, and 
that such negligence proximately contributed in 
any degree, to produce plaintiffs' damage, then 
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your verdiet 1nust be in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause for action." 
(Tr. 759). Exception 'vas taken to this instruc-
tion ( Tr. 593). 
Surely it cannot be rontended that there is any defi-
nition of negligence or contributory negligence in that 
instruction, because there was no criterion given to the 
jury by which to determine what constituted negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs Dastrup in the construction 
and n1aintenance of the gasoline storage facilities upon 
their premises. Was such ne~ligence· to be dete:rmined 
by the practice§ and customs followed in the area (Alta-
mont, a remote, small community in Duchesne County); 
by the ordinances in effect in Salt Lake City as testified 
to by defendants' witnesses; by what ordinarily. careful 
persons would have done under similar circumstances; 
or i~ som~ <;>~~er wanl}.er ~ The jurors were given no 
guide wp~tever by which to measure what constituted 
contributory negligence or what constituted care or want 
of care under the circumstances of this case. 
Instruction Number 14 gives some additional r~:a te-
rial, but finally winds up by saying: 
"* * * and if you further find that such neg-
ligence proximately contributed to produce their 
own damages as defined and set forth in Instruc-
tion Number 13 above, then you must find in 
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs." 
In other words, the court referred the jury back to 
Instruction Number 13 for his definition of contributory 
negligence (Tr. 760). The plaintiff excepted to the giving 
of Instructions Number 13 and 14 (Tr. 593). 
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The court nowhere, except in Instruction Nu1nber 
13, attempted to define contributory negligence, and in 
that instruction completely failed to outline to the jury 
that contribuory negligence must contain the same ele-
ments as negligence, and to give any standards for deter-
mining what constituted due care or want of care. 
This instruction is subject to the same criticism as 
the charge given in the case of Johnson vs. Lewis, 240 
Pacific 2nd 498, in which the Utah Suprerue Court said: 
"Now here in the instruction 'vas the jury told 
that negligence is a necessary element of con-
tributory negligence. Of course, negligence is a 
necessary element of contributory negligence and 
the jury should be so instructed." 
The court in the Johnson case further stated: 
"The phrase, 'which in any martner, however 
slight', is probably technically correct and would 
do no harm if the jury, in spite of it, keep in 
mind that there must be a negligent act, that is, 
an act which lacks ordinary care; and that such 
act must proximately contribute to cause the 
injury, that is, it must, as a natural and con-
tinuous sequence unbroken by any new or inter-
vening cause produce the injury complained of. 
But it see1ns hard to reconcile an act which has 
those causal qualities as being one whi'ch 'in any 
manner, however slight', causes or even prox-
imately contributes to cause the injury. In other 
words, it seems that in order for an act to con-
stitute negligence and proximately contribute to 
the causing of an injury it would have to be an 
effective cause thereof and not merely a slight 
cause of such injury. This phrase is calculated 
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to belittle thl• eausal relationship necessary be-
t,\Teen the contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
and the accident and tends to induce the jury to 
forget that such contributory negligence: must 
be the result of a negligent act and a contributing 
proximate cause of the injury, and, therefore, 
tends to confuse rather than enlighten the jury 
on that problem. 
"This tendency would not be so objectionable 
if the same type of phrase were used in describ-
ing the causal relationship required between the 
defendants' negligence and the accident or injury. 
But no such phrase was used in instructing on 
defendants' negligence." 
An analysis of Instructions No. 13 and 14 show that 
no understandable definition of contributory negligence 
for the guidance of the jury was given in those instruc-
tions. Such instructions were clearly erroneous under 
the Johnson case (240 Pac. 2nd 498) sup-ra. 
The instant cases we-re of such nature that they 
called for accurate unambiguous statements of the law 
for the guidance of the jury. 
In the case of Loverde et al. vs. Consumers Petrol-
eum Company (Illinois), 63 Northeastern 2nd 673, the 
court stated that: 
"Where a case is close on the facts the issues 
involved therein must be determined upon con-
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POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY INSTRUC-
TION NUMBER 16 BECAUSE UNDER THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEG-
LIGENCE. 
In Instruction Number 16 the court instructed the 
jury as follows: 
"You are further instructed that if you find 
from the evidence in this case, that the defend-
ants did those things that an ordinary prudent 
person would have done under si1nilar circun1-
stances, I charge you that they were not guilty 
of negligence and your verdict must be against 
the: plaintiffs, and both of them, and for the 
defendants." (Tr. 761). 
The plaintiffs duly excepted to the giving of that 
instruction in the following words: 
"Objects to the court's giving Instruction 
Number 16 and the whole thereof. 
"Objects to the court's giving Instruction 
Number 17, and the whole thereof, on the grounds 
and for the reasons that said instruction is not 
supported by, and is contrary to the law and the 
eytdence. 
"May I make the same statement of reason 
for my objection to Instruction Number 16~ May 
the record so show, your Honor~ 
"THE C·OURT: It may so show." (Tr. 594). 
The record is such that Instruction Number 16 
could not help but mislead the jury. The defendant 
Thoresen, who was also admittedly the agent of the 
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•'Q. _.A.t any ti1ne ,,·hile gas \Vas flo\ving into any 
of those tanks did you leave the hose running 
and go into the store~ 
''Q. I \\'"ent in for-
"Q. _A_ns\ver that, will you please~ 
H.;;.\. Yes. 
·~Q. While gas was running from your truck~ 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
''Q. Did you leave a hose unattended and go into 
the store~ 
··A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 409). 
Measured by any standard, surely an ordinarily 
prudent person wouldn't leave a truck unattended, from 
which such a dangerous substance as gasoline is flowing 
in large quantities through a hose into an intake such 
as the one described in this case. That such an act was 
in and of itself sufficient to cause the damages com-
plained of, is not contended, but that it was an act of 
negligence, and the negligent act which started the chain 
of circumstances that caused plaintiffs' damages is clear. 
Under the Court's Instruction Number 16, the jury could 
have assumed that such an act was not negligent, and 
was the conduct of a prudent, careful person. 
"Clearly, it is negligence in one delivering 
fuel oil to overflow the receiving tank through 
inattention to the amount of fuel being delivered." 
151 A.L.R. 1270, note (e), citing J. J. May our 
Mfg. Company vs. c·onsumers Oil Comp·any, 146 
P. (2) 738. 
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In Nolan et al. vs. Hasket (Ark.), 53 Southwestern 
2nd 996, it was held that leaving gasoline flowing through 
a hose from a gasoline truck into the intake of a storage 
tank unattended is negligence. 
Furthermore, the testimony of the· defendant Thore-
sen clearly shows that there was no gauge or check on 
the Allen Oil truck or on the hose to limit the amount of 
gas which could flow through or to measure the amount 
of gasoline passing from the gasoline tanker in to the 
storage tank. Only by listening to the sounds in the 
intake pipe and by watching the hose could the attendant 
tell when the storage tank was full (Tr. 413). 
Yet the defendant Thoresen, agent of the defendant 
Oil Company, freely admitted that he left the gasoline 
flowing unattended and went into the store (Tr. 409). 
The defendant Thoresen also admitted that he left 
plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, and C at the scene of the fire 
and explosion (Tr. 410-11). The hose nozzle, Exhibit A, 
according to the undisputed testimony, was found in the 
intake to the fill-pipe of the center gasoline storage tank 
after the fire (Tr. 26; 194). Exhibits B and C were also 
at the place of the fire. It is, therefore, indisputable 
that Thoresen dropped Exhibits B and C. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY IN-
STRUCTION NUMBER 18. 
In Instruction Number 18 the court instructed the 
jury on the theory that the fire and explosion might 
be found to have been an unavoidable accident, and went 
on to charge : 
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~~\\~hen all parties concerned in the happening 
of an accident have done, and at the time of the 
accident, are doing those acts, and only those 
acts, 'vhich a reasonable and p·rudent person 
under all of the facts and circumstances shown 
by the evidence, "'"ould do, and are doing such 
acts with the care and caution which ordinary 
and prudent persons, having due· regard for their 
own safety and the safety of others would use, 
and in spite of such care and prudence of the 
parties the accident occurs, then no person is 
responsible to the other person for the happening 
of the accident or for any damages resulting 
therefrom. Where no negligence of any party is 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
law simply requires the parties injured to bear 
their own loss. Thus, in order to hold the defend-
ants for the damages sought by the plaintiffs in 
this case, you must find the defendants negligent 
in some particular alleged in the Complaint, that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of their 
da1nage, and that plaintiffs were not guilty of 
contributory negligence as herein defined." (Tr. 
762). 
The plaintiffs excepted to that instruction and the 
whole thereof "on the grounds and for the reasons that 
such instruction is not supported by, and is contrary 
to the law and the evidence." ( Tr. 594) . 
That instruction is bad and erroneous for several 
reasons. 
In the first place, it could have so misled and con-
fused the jury that they might well have thought that 
the easy way out was merely to find the whole affair 
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was an accident and thereby avoid the responsibility 
of fixing the fault and going through the job of assessing 
damages if they found the defendants to be responsible. 
There was no intimation on the part of any of the 
parties in either of the cases that what happened was 
an accident or could be explained on the ground that 
it was an accident. The only vvay such a theory could 
have been applicable would have been to ignore all the 
evidence except that a fire and explosion occurred on 
the Dastrup premises. 
The plaintiffs' witnesses testified as to the leaving 
of the running gasoline unattended; that gasoline over-
flowed where it could go down into the storage vault 
and where it ran out onto the hot paven1ent on an August 
day; that under such circumstances it "\Vas inevitable 
that an explosive medium of gas, vapor and air would 
be formed; that there were numerous ways in which 
surface sparks could have been created; that the com-
pression engine did not go into operation at any ti1ne 
near the time of the occurrence of the explosion; that no 
fire extinguisher was carried on the truck; that there 
was no static chain on the truck to ground the electricity 
and that the plaintiffs' suffered thousands of dollars 
worth of damage. 
On the other hand the defendants directed their 
whole case to the proposition that Dastrups were negli-
gent in maintaining their storage tanks and that the 
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It is hard to understand \vhy the trial Judge \Vould 
instruct the jury th~t they n1ight find \vhat happened 
here \Yas an accident. 
In the case of f.t., ola n vs. Haskett (Arkansas), 53 
Soutlnvestern 2nd 996, leaving gasoline flowing from a 
truck unattended was held to be negligence. 
In Ou,ens vs. JI oberly Oil Compa.ny (l\1:issouri), 245 
Southwestern 369, a handler of g-asoline was held to be 
negligent by permitting the gasoline to fall ten inches 
through the air into a funnel. 
In the case of Standard Oil Company vs. R. I. 
Pitcher, 289 Federal 678, they held that the failure to 
carry chains to discharge static electricity was negligent. 
Other cases bearing on the question are : 
Scott Wilson and Son vs. Blaustien, 124 Atl. 886; 
Ta.te vs. Clauseen-Lawrence Company, 167 Southeaste1·n 
826; Leahy vs. Stoddard Oil Company, 107 N oi·theastern 
458; J. J.Mayou vs. Consumers Oil Company (Wyoming), 
14() Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243. S·ee also note 151 
A.L.R. 1243 beginning at page· 1261. 
In the J. J. Mayo~t Mfg. case, the court held that, 
"The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of the 
jury that a seller's servant was guilty of negligence in 
delivering oil into the buyer's fuel tank causing the tank 
to overflow and setting fire to the buyer's plant, where 
it is shown that the servant, after he had started to pun1p 
the oil into the tank, left and went into the building to 
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have the bill of lading receipted, although he did not 
know how much oil he had in the truck and had been 
warned not to overflow the fuel tank." 
The J. J. Mayou case is particularly applicable to 
the instant cases. 
It was, therefore, gross error to instruct on the 
theory of unavoidable accident. 
POINT NO. VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
In giving Instruction Number 19 the court charged 
the jury that even though they found that the defend-
ants did negligently spill gasoline as claimed, that the 
plaintiffs couldn't recover unless the jury should further 
find that the spilled gasoline was ignited through some 
further act of negligence on the part of the defendants 
or from natural causes (Tr. 763). 
That instruction was excepted to on the grounds 
that it was not supported by and was contrary to the 
law and the evidence and that it was misleading and 
could only serve to confuse the jury (Tr. 595). 
That instruction is clearly a mis-staten1ent and un-
doubtedly could have had the effect of misleading and 
confusing the jury. 
The law requires that a person handling gasoline 
in the manner in which the defendants undertook to 
deliver that dangerous substance to the Dastrup prem-
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In the case of Sta:fl-dard Oil Conlpany vs. Evans, 122 
Southern 735, \Yhere an attendant started gasoline run-
ning into an automobile tank, then left the hose unattend-
ed so that gas spilled over and out of the intake, the 
court held that gasoline is a very dangerous agency and 
highly con1bustible and that to permit it to overflow 
is undoubtedly negligent. \\Thether such negligence is the 
proximate cause of injuries which result depends upon 
whether the party \vho committed the negligent act 
should reasonably forsee what might result from the 
original negligence. The court held that a person handl-
ing gasoline is charged with the knowledge that the sub-
stance is highly inflammable and might be lighted in 
var1ous ways. 
In Lore~rde vs. Consumers Petroleum Company (Illi-
nois), 63 Northeastern 2nd 673, the court held that: 
"A person contributing to a tort, vvhether his 
fellow contributors are men, nature or other 
forces, or things, is responsible for the \vhole, the 
same as though he had done all without help." 
The real Eleasure of the negligence of the defend-
ants is not as set forth in the court's instruction No. 19, 
but as to whether the defendants having spilled gasoline 
should have forseen the probable consequences of releas-
ing gasoline onto hot pavement on a clear August day 
under the circumstances testified to in this case. 
It was, therefore, erroneous to instruct the jury that 
the chain of causation was broken after the negligent 
act of spilling gasoline, unless an additional act of negli-
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gence on the part of the same negligent person ignited 
the inflammable and explosive substance resulting from 
the spilled gas and vapor uniting with air. 
In the case of Lea.hy vs. Standard Oil Company 
(Mass.), 107 Northeastern 458, one who delivered gas 
and permitted it to overflow was held liable for damages 
which resulted several weeks later when the gasoline 
which had been negligently released was ignited by the 
person to whom it had been delivered when he had no 
knowledge that defendant had perrnitted gasoline to 
escape. 
The instruction was loaded with misleading and 
confusing implications, and was not a true statement 
of the law applicable to the case. 
POINT NO. VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 22. 
In Instruction No. 22 the court told the jury that if 
any person other than the defendants was negligent 
and such negligence was the proximate cause of the fire 
and explosion complained of then a. verdict could not 
be found in favor of the plaintiffs, unless it was also 
found that the defendants were guilty of negligence 
and their negligence combined with that of some third 
person to produce the damage complained.of (Tr. 764). 
This instruction was excepted to on the grounds that 
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There isn •t a particle of evidence in the entire record 
to indicate that the regligence of nny third person could 
have entere-d into the picture. This instruction had to 
be drawn out of the air. Neither party produced any 
evidence whatever that any act on the part of any third 
person could have constituted negligence- which was the 
proximate cause of the injuries con1plained of. 
But even if a third person were involved the instruc-
tion \vas still erroneous. In the case of Loverde vs. Con-
sulners Petrolettm Company, 63 Northeastern 2nd 673, 
the court held that: 
"A person contributing to a tort, whether his 
fellow contributors are men, nature, or other 
forces, or things, is responsible for the whole 
the same as though he had done all without help." 
POINT NO. IX. 
AS TO THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE COMPANY IN CASE NO. 7734, THE 
COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
DIRECTING THE JURY TO FIND THE ISSUES AGAINST 
THE SAID PLAINTIFF IF IT FOUND THAT DEAN COX, 
DRIVER OF THE MOON LAKE TRUCK, WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE . 
.. 
There is no evidence whatever in the record that 
Dean Cox, driver of the truck covered by the insurance 
policy of the plaintiff Insurance Company, was guilty 
of any negligence whatsoever. It wasn't even hinted in 
the testimony at any point that Cox knew anything about 
the manner in which the Dastrup tank and compressor 
were installed. It is clear, therefore, that if there was 
any negligence on the part of the Dastrups that such 
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negligence could not be imputed to Mr. Cox. If, there-
fore, the defendants were entitled to rely upon contribu-
tory negligence as a defense against the plaintiff Em-
ployers Liability Insurance Company, such defense had 
to be based upon some act of negligence on the part of 
Mr. Cox himself. Of course, inasmuch as Mr. Cox was 
the agent of the company owning the truck, any negli-
gence on his part, had any such negligence been shown, 
would have been attributable to his en1ployer and to the 
plaintiff Insurance Company. That there is no such 
record of negligence found in the evidence presented 
at the trial is clear from the court's own observations 
given in his memorandum denying the Inotion of the 
Insurance Company for a new trial. In that Inemoran-
dum the court made these observations: 
"If timely request had been made by the 
plaintiff Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 
Company for an instruction taking from the jury 
the question of negligence on the part of the 
driver of the insured's trucks, there is little 
doubt that it would, or at least that it should 
have been given. There is only one circumstance 
which even hints of negligence on the part of the 
driver Cox, and that is he attempted to fill his 
own gasoline tank without waiting for the attend-
ant, but the court is satisfied that there is no 
implication of negligence from such a circun1-
stance." ( Tr. 802). 
In making these comments the court appears to 
have entirely overlooked his instruction No. 23 'vhich 
reads as follows: 
"Instruction No. 23-Y ou are instructed as to 
the con1plaint of the plaintiff Employers Mutual 
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Liability Insurance Co1npany of "\vTisconsin, if 
you find that Dean Cox, driver of the truck 
belonging to Moon Lake Electric Association, 
was negligent in any respect and such negligence 
proximately contributed to the explosion and fire 
and said plaintiffs' damage, then the plaintiff 
Employers l\iutual Insurance Company of Wis-
consin cannot recover." (Tr. 764). 
The court also failed to consider the exception taken 
to Instruction No. 23 by plaintiff Employers Mutual 
Liability Insurance Company before the instructions 
were given to the jury, which exception reads as follows: 
"Objects to the court giving instruction No. 
23, and the whole thereof, on the grounds and for 
the reason that the instruction is not supported 
by the law and the evidence, and particularly 
that there is no evidence of negligence on the part 
of Dean Cox upon ·which the jury could base 
liability or negligence." ( Tr. 603). 
It is obvious that the court in his ruling denying 
a new trial completely ignored this instruction and the 
specific exception taken thereto. In his memorandum 
denying the plaintiffs' motion for new trial the trial 
Judge further said : 
"Where contributory negligence was pleaded 
in both causes in almost identical language, and 
especially, where by stipulation of the parties, 
both causes were tried together, it could not be 
consistently said that the court moves entirely 
at its peril. Certainly some duty rests upon the 
parties to assist the court, through their respec-
tive counsel, to avoid error. In this case, counsel 
for the liability company stated both plaintiffs' 
objections and exceptions. In several instances 
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he objected to proposed instructions referring 
to contributory negligence citing as his basis 
that they were not in accord with the law or the 
facts, but he made the objection generally and 
never once intimated that his basis was for his 
separate pla.intijf, or that there was no evidence 
in the record tending to prove Cox's negligence." 
(Tr. 803). 
The court in his memorandum then moves on to deal 
with generalities and makes a comment not supported 
by the record when he says : 
"Either the plaintiffs were, at the time of 
stating their objections and entering their excep-
tions, as oblivious to the state of the record as 
to this point, as he Court, or they deliberately 
sought to build error to their. advantage. Of 
course, this court is certain that the latter was 
not the case. It nevertheless is patent from the 
record that the court's attention was not called 
to the situation now urged; it had no opportunity 
to correct its instructions to save the error; the 
plaintiffs failed to perform their duty to assist 
the Court, and they may not now claim the right 
of a new trial upon an error which they failed 
to recognize in time, or failed to call to the 
Court's attention in time to avoid." (Tr. 803-
804). 
The foregoing comment we again repeat was made 
by the court because he failed to consider, or overlooked, 
his instruction Number 23 giving the jury specific in-
structions as to the contributory negligence of Dean Cox, 
and paid no attention to the record made by counsel for 
the plaintiffs when they specifically objected to Instruc-
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tion No. ~3 on the ground .. that there is no ev,idence of 
negligence on the part of Dean Cox, upon which the 
jztry could base liabili.ty or negligence." 
The question of the negligence of Dean Cox vvas 
also saved by the plaintiffs' requested Instruction N uin-
ber 1 for a directed verdict. 
Under the provisions of Rule 50 (b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, when a request for a directed verdict 
was made, the trial court had the right to re-consider 
the whole matter relating to the alleged contributory 
negligence of Cox on the motion !or new trial. 
It was clearly error on the court's part, according 
to his own admissions, to submit the question of con-
tributory negligence in the Employers Mutual Liability 
Insurance case where there is no evidence in the· record 
from which the jury could have found negligence on the 
part of Cox, the agent of the insured Electric Company. 
"A plaintiff is guilty of contributory negli-
gence only insofar as he, or some person for 
whose conduct he is resp·onsible, is at fault." 
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 181 page 858. 
Surely it requires no citation of authorities to sup-
port the proposition that where there is no evidence 
of contributory negligence as against the plaintiff, as 
the trial court concedes in its memorandum denying the 
motion of the Insurance Company for new trial, it is 
error to charge the jury that it may find the plaintiff 
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guilty of contributory negligence as the court instructed 
the trial jury in Instruction Number 23 in the Employers 
Liability case as distinguished from the Dastrup case. 
See 45 C.J. p. 1171, § 755; also 45 C.J. p. 1152, § 741. 
POINT NO. X. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING TI-IE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYERS 
LIABILITY COMPANY. 
This proposition has been discussed rather exten-
sively under several points. In discussing the error 
committed by the court in giving its Instruction Nmnber 
23 charging the jury that if they found Dean Cox guilty 
of any contributory negligence that the Insurance c·om-
pany could not recover, we pointed out that the court 
in his memorandum denying the plaintiffs' motion for 
new trial conceded that Dean Cox was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence, and gave as his only reason for 
denying the motion for new trial that counsel for the 
plaintiff Insurance Company had not directed the court's 
attention to the fact that the record was devoid of any 
evidence of contributory negligence on Mr. Cox's part at 
the time the instructions were given. In our argument 
under point No. IX. we have pointed out specifically that 
Instruction Number 23, relating solely to a charge that 
if the jury found Dean Cox was guilty of contributory 
negligence, the insurance company could not recover, 
was erroneous, and that specific exception was taken 
to the instruction by counsel for the plaintiff on the 
ground that there was no evidence whatever in the 
record of negligence on the part of Dean Cox. 
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The court should have granted a ne'v trial for the 
reasons set forth under the other points discussed in this 
brief, and it was> therefore, obvious error on the court's 
part to deny the motion for new trial made by the plain-
tiff Insurance Company. The plaintiff in its motion 
for new trial claimed that error in law occurred at the 
- - - . - ~ . . . 
trial. The trial court really ha.s confessed ~hat he di<f 
commit such error in submitting to the jury instruction 
No. 23. 
POINT NO. XI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF 
THE PLAINTIFFS DASTRUP FOR NEW TRJAL. 
This proposition has ~lso been discussed under the 
ot:h.er point~ pr~~en~~d in t:q.is br:l.et. 
W ~ ag~ill direct special attent~on to the failure 
and refus~l of the court to admit the testimony of 0. C. 
Allen, president of the defendant, Allen Oil Company, 
to the effect that he knew on and before August 23, 1946, 
the date of the fire and explo.sion, just how the storage 
tanks and other facilities were installed and maintained 
on the Dastrup premises, and notwithstanding that fact 
made the delivery of gasoline in question. 
We also direct attention again to the failure of the 
trial court to give plaintiffs' requested Instructions No. 
6 and 7, which under the J. J. Mayou Mfg. Co. case (146 
Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243) was a proper statement 
of the law and gave a theory of the case which the 
plaintiffs were entitled to have presented to the jury. 
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Attention should also be called to the discussion 
relating to the giving of Instructions No. 13, 14, 16 and 
the other instructions excepted to and discussed in other 
portions of this brief. 
We have a firm conviction that the jury was not 
properly instructed in either of the cases; that many 
of the court's rulings were erroneous and that the plain-
tiffs in each case were and are definitely entitled to a 
new trial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
the trial of the case and in instructing the jury, and in 
his denial of the motions of the plaintiffs for new trials 
for the reasons hereinbefore stated, and that the verdict 
and judgment entered by the. lower court should be 
reversed and set aside and the court directed to grant 
to the plaintiffs new trials. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILSON A~D WILSON, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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